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Friday, July 1, 1892. 
LIEUT.-GESERAG E. 11. CLIVE, Governor R o p l  Jl i l i tarj  College, 
Snndhurst, Ncrnber of Council, in  the Clink. 
THE FREHCI? JIAKCEUVRES O F  1891. 
By bfajo19 G. F. R. HESDERSOS, York and Lancaster Regimenb 
(Instructor in Tactics, llilitary Administration and Law, R o j d  
Nilitary College, Sandhurst). 
THE French Autumn 3Inximuvres of is01 arc undoubtedly to be 
reckoned amongst tho more important military incidents of late 
team. Pour corps d’arrnbc and two cavnlry divisions took part in 
h e m ;  aud although I bclievc even larger bodies haw been assombled 
in  Itussia for a sirriihr purpose, this was the first occasion on which 
KO large a force has becn brought together in peace-time, and all 
Europe gmnted lenvc to judgo for itself tlic cficicncy of the troops 
for war. Still grcatcr interest attached to tho Occasion, since it was 
thc  first appearance of a French Army, properly constituted, sinec 
the dark days of 1870 and 1871, and I think it was generally felt 
thnt n fair oppoi*tuxiity was offercd of comparing the soldicrs of the 
Republic with their ill-fated predecessors under the Empire. I liave 
never ceased to congratulate mjsclf that  I had thc good fortune to 
be able to attend the manaxvrcs, although i n  an unofieial capacity. 
Not only was them B good deal of ctramiitio interest nttending tho 
grcnt gatliering with which tho French Govexmucut marked the 
coming of age of the Republic ; not only was tlio spectacle, favoured by 
glorious weather and with magnificent country for its theatre, brilliant 
i n  the extreme, but no soldier can see 110,000 troops marching and 
manczlurring for several days in  succcssion without enlarging his ideas 
and acquiring much uscful information. Nor mms there the slightest 
difficulty made as to spcctntors secing everything that was to be sen .  
l h -c r j t l~ ing  was perfectly open and above-board ; our srnall party 
of six English Ofhers  was permitted to movo about whercver we 
pleased ; and all ranks of tho Army, from the  Generals downwards, 
were most courteous in answering questions and giving i~iformatioxi. 
Moving t h w  freely over the ficld, standing alongside thc batteries in 
action, going forward with the  firing Iiue, accompanjing the regi- 
ments on the xnnrch, and talking to tlie O5icers on picquet, we hnd a 
most excellent opportunity of studying practical tactics, arid also of 
obtaining an insight into the interior working of the units, the 
TOL. XXIVK. 3 K  
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8liO TIIE FRESCI? MAS(EUIRES OF 18!)1. 
discipline, thc cndurancc, and tho mobility of tlic troops, and also into 
tho relations hetwccn Ofliccrs and men. 
, It is becausc wo liad th is  opportunity, tliat I think thc imprcssions 
mndo on English rcgimcrital Oficcrv by the work and appenraiicc of 
tlie Frcncli Army may prorc irrterestinz to sorno of you. We hi- 
spcctcd tlic troops so thorougliIy, that,, dcspito our lack of cspcriencc, 
I do not belicvc that wc carried away many erroneous ideas. 
I h a ~ c  no intention of comparing thc Frcnch Army \vith our own 
or any 0 t h ;  cvcn w-erc I cornpetcnt to do so, 1 donbt wlicflicr sucli. 
coui1):irison would scrvc a useful pnrposc. Still I sliall not. confiric 
znysclf strictly to describing wliat I saw. Thcrc is a coniparisoii 
it-hich may be fairly r n a d o o n e  which, to my mind, is of equal 
intcrcst aid  imporlanccarid that is, n comparison bctwxn thc 
Frciicli Army of to-day and that ~vliich ~vckiicw lone nno-tho Army 
which lost all but its Iionoiir in tlie autumii of 1870. *‘l‘Iic constitu- 
tion and tlie fanlta of that Artrip have bccn vcry tl~orouglily exposcd. 
Ercry student of war, soldier or civilian, knou-s thcni by licnrt, and I 
:isk 1-ou to rccall tho Army of 1670 mlien I describe what I sa.w in 
3591. 
M y  cxperienco lias been, in discussing tlie Republican troops with 
botli soldicrs :uid civili:ins, tliat rnatiy Iinrc forgotten tliat twenty-onc 
p a r s  hnvo clapscd sirice Paris fcll, and tliat very few liarc paid atten- 
tion to tlie’grcnt changes in organization and in training wliicli linvc 
liecn made iii tho military systcli) of France. It is snrprising liow fcw 
men you find who rcnlizc that whilo tlic old Irnpurial Army was R 
profcssioml i\rrny, roniposed of iiicn who, homxer g.nllant they may 
linvc bccu, wcrc ccrtaiiily not iiic~i of high cI:iss, thc ilrniy of to-day 
is the nation in arms, rccriiitcd from evcry grade of society, and with 
tliousauds wlio boast tliu bcst blood and tho oldcst names iu France 
scrririg as privates in tho ranks. . 
Uriivcrsal scrvice, vcry strictly enforccd, and tlic abolition of tlic 
sjstem of snbstitutcs, lias entirely changed the cliamctcr of tlic raiili 
niid filc, mising tlic averago of intclligencc, nnd promising a stricter 
scnsc of discipliiiu and dnty than existed in 1870. 
TIie country linndcd over to tlic troops from tlic 3rd to tho 18th 
nf Scpt.cuiber is that district of Cliarnpngiic wliicli is wntcrcd by 
tho Aube, the Jfnriic, and tho Sciuc. x district alrcady tnrnouv in tho 
uririals of wa1; and cont,aininR within its boundnrics the military 
school whcre N:ipolcon was cducatcd, and many of tho battlc-fields 
of 1814. The tract actually occnpicd is iu tlio tilinpc of a triangle, 
of which Trilr~--lc-l~ranqois, to tlie north, is tbc L L ~ X ,  :md a liiic 
running from Troycs . to Cliaunront tho base. The distaucc from 
X t r y  to Troycs and Chauniont is, rouglily spcakirig. about GO miles, 
:ind from Troycs to Chnuinorit the same, tlic area of opcrations con: 
tniiiing 3,600 square miles, :L tract x good dcal largcr tlian tlic county 
of Kcnt. This coontry is ndlriimbly ridaptcd for rnnnmuvrcs, the 
rnosb striking fcaturc Icing tlie great rolling downs, tho great forests, 
and thc mgnificcut roads. W i t h  tlic cuccption of Trojcs, tlierc is 110 
considerable town ; tlic ground i s  undulating, with mitlicr natural nor 
artificiai. obstacles to tlic frec movetucnt of d l  arms, arid cvcrywlicre 
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TIIE FRESCH MAS(EUVRES OF 18’31. 861 
two most important military rcpisitcs arc to be obtained-wide view 
fill(1 long mngc. The c~~valry  and artillcrj- aro as wcll served as tlic 
infantry, and no better tlientre for the  niovcxncrits of largc bodies 
(.ou!d bc im:igined. ‘l’h only objection is tho \mnt of watcr ; brooks 
:~nd wclls nrc fcw and far betwccii, and tho drainagc of the  country 
appears to be confined to tlic rivers. Tilo soil docs not admit of rnucli 
cultivation, aiid oven tlirt viiiejnrds arc by BO means numerous. As 
lisual i n  Fmiicc and Gerninny, thcre erc fuw walls or hcdgcs csccpt 
iiniiiccliatcly round thc farms mid villagcs, and thcsc :ire at widc 
intervals. A s  rcg:irds minor tactics; thcreforc, tlic ground was too 
opcii to give mnch scopu for ndroit skii*misliing or skilful hnndling of 
.,,llnll bodies of troops, but thc long riilgcs, tlic dccp vnllcjs, ant1 the 
cxtensivt: forests cn:iblcd tho commanding Gencrals t o  find plciity of 
covcr for their masses, either whcu approaciiing tlie encuiy or wlieii 
dcfcuding n position. 
Tho ~ x ~ a n o u i r c s  proper commenced on thc 3rd of Septcmbcr, b u t  
tlie rcservists werc called iii aiid joiucd on tlio 1st. and iriaiiy of tliu 
rcgimcnts had bccu marchiug for scvcral dnjs bcforc they rcnchcd 
the  scat of wai.. 
The  corps engaged n-cr’o tho 5th, 6th, itli, and s th ,  of wliicli tlic 
three lattcr are periuanently yuartcrcd on tho bordcr, and constitute 
tile frontier giiard of Fluncc. The two divisions of cnvnlry, tlic 1st 
and 5tb, wcro cacti coniposed of t h e e  brigades of two rq+cnts, one 
of cuirassiers, one of dra,noons, aiid on0 of light cavalry, hussars or 
clinsscurs. To cacli cavalry division wcrc nttncbcd tlircc bnttcrics, 
:ind to each corps d’nrm6c no less than twciity, that  is 120 p u s  on R 
n-nr footing, sir bciiig assigned to cncli division. There is here :L 
rcinax*kablc incrcasc siucc 1S70. In tii:it rear tho Frcncli corps 
cl’arm6u took the field with twclvc ficld bnttcrics iristead of twciitj, 
:is now, and each division with but two field battcrics and one 
mitraillcuse instcad of six ficld lxittcrics. 
To cadi corps d‘arrn6c \\-as ntt:iclied a light cavalry bripadc of two 
rogiments. 
Anotlicr pcculiaritr of nrgsnizitioii mere thc two prorisional 
brigadcs, one of cliiisscui.s-li-picd, slid nnothcr of Iiiarines. OF clios- 
~uiirs, or rifles, as I niny call tlicin, tlicrc wero sercii lnttalioris, 
brigndcd togcrliei; nnd of mariuc iiifantry the sainc. Tlieru wcre also 
tlircc marine field bntturics. 
Of the strength of tho various units i t  is not ncccssary to say 
much. 
The iiifantry battalions scldorn numbered more tlinn GOO bayoncts ; 
the  cavalry about 100 horses pcr squndrou; and .tlin bnttcrics each 
four guns aiid tlirec ~rngoiis, with tho exception of the liorsc nnd 
inariuc battcrics, wliicli I1:id a fu l l  coniplcnicut. An intercstiiig 
point-is the nuiiibcr of tho rcs-ervists. Of courso it was inipossildo 
to dctect from pcrsuiial observation how inany of thcsc wcrc in the 
ranks, but I gatlicr from various sources that, on nn average, tlicrc 
wcro about 200 per battalion. 
Tho niarine reserrists lind I ~ S O  bccn called np, and tlicir battalions 
wcrc rather strongcr than tliosc nf tlie line. 
3 x 2  
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862 THE FRESCH I?.AS(EUVRES OF 1891. 
The course the manmurres took was as follows :- 
The 5th Corps d'ArmCe, concentrating about Et. ROmy to the 
F;outh, manceurrcd against tlie Gtli Corps, conccntinting a t  Vitiy, 
30 miles to the north-east. On the 2nd. of September the resnrrists 
arrived; on the 3rd the troops moved forward, and on tlic 4th the 
two forces fonglit an action a t  Aulnay, on the Voire, some 20 miles 
distant from the localities of concentration. 
On tlie same date the 7th find 8th Corps met a t  3lont Saon, near 
Chaumont 
On the following da1, the 5th of September, the 5th and 6th Corps 
joined hands, and passed under the command of General dc Galliffet, 
i u  order to manmuvre as an army against the 7th and Sth, who Iiad 
'united under General Darout, and tlic Headquarter Staff, General de 
Saussier and his Chief of the Staff, General de Niribel, took over the 
supervision of the operations. The two armies moved forward on 
the 5th, each marching some 30 miles, and after a cavalry fight on 
the  5th, and a day of rest on Sunday, the 6th, met in battle a t  
Colombey-les-deux I& >*lises on the 7th. 
On the 8th General do Gallifet, rr-crossing the Anbe, was pursued 
by General Davout, nnd on the 9th ivas fought the action of r e n -  
deuvrc, n t  which 11. de Freyciiiet, Niuister of War, and the foreign 
Nilitary Attach& were present. 
This action ended the necond period of the manrsnvrcs. On the 
l l t h ,  after a day of rest, the two armies combined, under the com- 
mand of General de Saussier, moved against D masked enemy, com- 
posed of the provisional brigades oE chasseurs and marines, 14 
battalions, 9 batteries, and 12 squadrons. 
Tho night of the 12th saw the passage of the Voire; and'on the 
following dax, the lath,  the four corps moved in R north-westerly 
direction, disposed in  square, so as to be reads to meet attack cither 
in front or flank. 0 1 1  tbc 14th the marked army was defeated a t  
Nargerie-Hnncourt, On the 25th the pursuit was taken up, and thc 
troops readied the vicinity of %try, where, after R day of rest on the 
16th, the manmurres terniinated on t.he 17th by a march past of tlie 
~vliolc force before the President of the Republic. This p r o p m m e ,  
starting from September the 3rd, of 14 days' work. girea 12 days of 
marching and fighting to 3 days' rest and 1 day for tho march past. 
Tlie 6th Corps, wliich originally concentrated a t  Vitry, returned 
thither for tlic final review, having traversed in the 12 working days 
about 110 miles, and been engaged in five actions. 
The 
geneid ideas were issued with the object of bringing the opposing 
forces into contact'on pre-determined battle-fields, and not one of the 
Gcnorals liad any opportnnity o€ displaying liis skill in manceurres 
outside the battle-field. There is no doubt that this circumstance 
deprived the operations of much of their interest, and the War 
Ninistry has been severely criticized, in Fnnce ~8 elsewhere, for 
thus  tying the Lands of the +dew, and confining their efforts to the 
handling of their troops in  action. But i t  must be remembered, first, 
that tlie assembling of 100,000 men was an experiment ; secondly, 
As to the strategy of tho manaxvres little need be said. 
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THE FRESCH JIASCEUVRES OF 1891. SG3 
that Champapnc is n poor country, lacking in both supplies and 
qunrtcrs ; nnd, thirdly, that t h  olicct of lliu rnanmuvres wns to test 
tho cnpacity of thc Staff in hindling mnsscb of men nnder norrnitl 
conditions. 
dificulty in proportion to the numl)er of tlaops c~igaged, and side Iiy 
sidc rnarcbcs tlic question of crpcnse. I n  tlic first pl:icc, it may bc 
notcd that tlie ordiiiiiry railway traffic in tlik district. was not inter- 
fered with during the manceuvres ; secondly, that long notice was 
rcqnircd to cnnblc tlic ri!lngc authorities to'accumuliitc tlie siippliea 
th:it were rcqnisitioiicd ; a d ,  thirdly, that tho sum voted for tlic 
annual nmnaxivrcs amounted to 230,0001. stcrling. 
At thc pauic timc, tlic csistcncc of n programme, workcd out' loiig 
bcforcliand down to tbc iniriutcst detail, and known to all engaged, 
not only deprives us of :in opportnriity of dctcrmining tlic strategird 
skill of tlic Gcncrals, but of judging tlic r e d  eflicieiicy of tlic Staif, 
a i d  i t  must be bornc in mind, Iio\vcver remarkable tho sniootli 
working of the hitter may linvc nppcnrcd, tliat i t  wns not wry 
highly tricd. On thc field of battle tlic rcstrictione of tlic prograi~~~riiu 
wcrc lcss fclt. Tlic Gmernls had iritlccd little clioicu of positioiis, 
:ind littlc lntitudc ns to liiics of attack, bnt this is R disndvnntngc 
which is conspicuous hy its presciicc in nctunl warfiwc. A Gciicxd is 
morc oftcn called upon to sliow his skill in Irinkiiig tlic bcst of a b a i l  
position tlian in  sclcctiiig IL good one, iii attacking n stron: line tlinii 
in finding ont :L weak point. T h o  grirtid tactics, thercforc. of tho 
inanmuvrcs, compnriitivcly unfcttcrcd as t h y  wcrc, c m  hnrdly fail 
to be of interest, nnd I will try arid put tliclri before you froni a 
gc:ner;d point of vicw. 
IIcrc tbcrc w:w 
110 clcpnrtuin from norm:il proccdurc. Wlien corps moved :i,nninst 
corps both were scrccued by their ca~n1r.y brigades ; when army 
moved against army tlic c:walry divisions led tllc nctnnce; but, as 
regairls tlic working of tho screcn, tlic short distance apart a t  which 
tlic opposing forcca started, ncver niorc t h n  40 milcs ; tlic exact 
knowledge of tlie cncriiy's point of concentration, his line of :idvnncc, 
and tlie locdity of tho cngngcmcnt that must ensue, undoubtedly 
robbcd tlic cavalry of much instructioli, :ind wcrc l>y no means protluc- 
tivc of an excess of zeal or interest. Still tlic work was done on tlio 
usual lines. Officers' p t ro ls  scouied the ro;ids, mid tlic brigades 
01- divisions a lwap came togetlicr in ortliodos fashion during tlio 
(by prcccding thc geneinl engagerneiit. Tlic infantry and artillery, 
me:inwhilc, covcied l y  strong ndvnnced guards with b:itteries w?ll 
to tlie front, occupied their nssigned cautonnicnts, and the cardry 
dmw off to thc fl:inks, leaving tlie scouting bctu\*ecii tlic opposiiog 
lines to bc doric by tho divisional cnralry or infantry patrols. niit 
wlicn oricc the troops wcrc iii position, :iltlioiigli invisible to each 
'other, there was very little of this kind of work done; and, esccpt 
from au instructional point of vicw, it wis uniiccessary. Tlicre \%:is 
no furtlicr information to bc gained. The battles, as n ru le ,  b e p i  
with R prolo'nged artillcrj cxigagcmcnt, ofteq at ratlicr loiig ranges, 
r t  l h c  question of supply, moreorer, g r o w  in importancc and in 
To bcgiti with the proccss of taking u p  contact. 
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8 G4 
Idween 3,500 and 4,500 yards. Tlic artillcry, without special cscort, 
wiis employed in  masses, wherever the ground pcrmittcd in  two tiers, 
nnd camc iuto action by groups of three batteries. Whilc this prc- 
liiiiinnrj- IVRS taking plncc, tlic infantry was deploying for action uiidci* 
.c.ovcr. of the woods and nndolations. Tliia deployment was a long 
pi-oecss, much attention and supervision being givcn to tlic ordering 
of tlic sncccssivc lincs bcfore tlicy were permitted to advance, and 
until all was ready for tlieir movcmcnt, tbc  front was corcrcd by 
fitrorig poiuts in thc in t e rn l s  of tlie nrtil1or)r bcing held by tho 
cltasseurs-ir-~nkJ, and tlle battalions of tlie advnriccd guards. During 
this stngc, the cnggemcnt was nsunily confined to tlic artillcry; 
tlicrc was littlc skirmishing, both sides appearing to rnly on the 
rapid arid irnpctuous attack of a large inass dmwn up at the  ontset in 
good order, and to discourngc minor #enterprises against t l c  outljing 
posts of t.lic defciice. The destruction or driving in  of sucli posts was 
gcncmlly lcft t.o tlic artiller~-. 
I liere spcak of both sides, for very often Goth sides assumed the  
offensin?, the next st.age of the battlo being an dmost  simultaneous 
:idrmcc of two of the opposing wings. This double attack was :L 
curious feature, and indiciites, I venture to think, that  tlic mainspring 
of the French tactics of to-day is the offensin?, a very differcnt idc i  
to that which pcvailed in 1870. Of cour~c, in such a prccccding, 
one side, favoured either by tho groundor by deploying morc rapidly, 
wized the initiatire, and tlircw its opponcnts on the defcnsirc. But 
cwi i  under thcsc circurnstnuccs the doctririo that d c t 1  lies in attack 
soon asscrtcd itsclf, and wlicnercr tho nssailnnts’ advance was cliccked 
n etrong counter-attack was rnadc by thc wing liitl,mto unengaged, 
this movement bcing niadc with thc  same order, prccisiou, and 
strength as that  wliicli iuitiated tlic h t t l c .  During tlio infautix 
fighting, tlic cavalry brigades x-orked with tlicir own C O I ~ B ,  a very 
short distancc in i r n r  .of tlie .fighting line, wldst  tlic divisions inan- 
clclrvred .ag,ndnst cach otlior$on tLc wings, or as a t  Veridcuvrc, thc 
most important battle, clinrgcd the  flank of tlic advancing infmtq-. 
Tho engagements began about 6 o’clock in tlic morniug, and the 
cease fire was ordcred by the Uinpire.in:CBicf wlicn the infantrr hnd 
come inbo closc contact all d o n g  tlic liric, generally about 1 o’clock. 
Siich wcrc the main features of thc g rmdhc t i c s .  First, the coiiceii- 
tixtion of tlic cavalry divisions foiming tho screen ; secondly, the  
cniploymcnt of thc artillcry in masses.; ,thirdly, tho energctic attack 
of a largc mass,moving in abody agiiilist thc tactics1 objective; and, 
fourthly, tlie constant .tendency to nssumc the offensive. 
- I m a j  notice that .this tendency is likcly to prcvent gne of tlic 
coinnionest faults conirnittcd by tlic G.encrals in 1870, that  of sub- 
mitting to the  attack of 1\11 unsupported advanced guard, n-itliont 
niaking the slightest attempt to dcstroy thcir audacious autagonist. 
Orcr and over ngaiii I noticed constant cndcavows to tes t  tlic 
strength of the e m m ~ - ’ s  advanccd,gunrd, which, had there been no 
supports at hand,. would nndoubtcdly havc bccn converted into 
cnorgetic ntfacks. 
I will now speak of cach arm in detail, and hcrc I &hall makc frcp 
THE FHESCH 3IAXCJiUVRES OF 1891. 
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THE FRESCLI MAS(EUVRES OY 1891. SG5 
! I S C  of the letters written to the “ Times,” by their corrcEpondcnt a t  
tho mnnccnncs. 
I havc alrcndy spoken of tho largo number of 
Iiattcrics attached to each corps d’arrnbc, thirtpsix morc gnris than 
in our own organization, and for a long timc it has becn wcll known. 
that this powerful arm hns  rcachcd R high statc of cficicncr in 
Prancc. It is wcll horsed, manauvrcs with prccision, if not with 
rapidity, is well oficered, and the Inen aro of superior physiquc to- 
thc rest of the army. 
To its cniplolmcnt in masses and in two ticrs, whcrcrcr possible, 
I havc already alluded, and, so far as I could see, tho positions wcrc 
gcnerally judiciously chosen. In tlic cngagcment against thc marked 
cncmy, Gcncral do Saussicr deployed forty batteries, rcprcscntiag, had 
each battery been equipped a t  war strength, 240 puns, in :I’ singlc linc 
between his two armies, and at Vcndcuvrc I counted twenty bnttcrien 
in mass on Gcricrnl do Galliffct’s left. That tlicrc wcrc mistakes madc 
in selecting positioiis goes without saying, but tho instarices that csino 
under my noticc wcrc mrc, and it was imp,ossiblc not to noticc tho 
order, regularity, quict ivorkiug, and good drill cvcrywhcrc visible. 
Tho batteries wcrc cacli nccornpauicd by thrcc wagons, and each group 
of three by n fighting train. Tlic firc disciplinc \vas good, aod carc was 
given to the Iajing, but,, as has been raid elscwhcrc by an lhglisli 
critic, tlic concciitcltion of a Iargc number of guns on L singlc targct 
does riot appear to bc considcrcd csscutinl. Howver, this is a point 
on which it is rery dificult to gcncmlizr!; circumstances may soinc- 
timcs compcl an artillery Comm:inder to assign to individual batteries 
t:irgcts wliich arc far apart ; morcovcr, I linvc ncrcr sccn this qucstiou 
of coricentrntion thoroughly discusscd, nnd I think many Officcrs wlio 
nrc not gunners have somcwlint vnguc ideas respecting it. For 
instancc, wlieii artillcry is firing on n linc of infantry advancing, it 
would sc:irccly lo judicious, cvcn wcro it  feasible, for cvcry gun in 
R long linc of bnttcries to direct its firc on single battalion. Tliu 
bnttalion so favonrcd would possibly suffer, but tho rcmainder r o u l d  
escape, nrid pei*haps reach covcr bcforc tlicir timc mmc to play tho 
part of target. Tlicro was one thiiig to lo rcrnarkcd conccriiing tho 
tnkiiig up of position, and this is thiit tho Frcnch disregard cover in 
favour of precision and steadincss. Thc batteries, cvcn when unlim- 
bering on grouiid alrcady undcr firc, did so without thc least attcmpt 
at 1iuIry, and very often the tcnms and lirnbcrs were kept closc iii  
rear of tlic guns on opcn ground, notwithstanding the fact that tlicrc 
was cover to be found a fcw paces furthcr back. Nor did I noticc or 
Iicar of R single case in mhich g u n s  wcrc kept bchind tho crcst and 
run  up by hand ; perhaps tho weight of the piccc may Iiavo sornetliing 
to do with this, but my impression is that this prccaution is con& 
dcred useless wlicri bat.tcrics arc cmplojed in mass. T h y  rcly for 
protection rather on tlicir own firc than on’ cxpedicnts nliicli cau 
seldom bc mom than partially applied. 
Tho positious of tlic groups of bnttcries arc always sclccted by tlic 
artillery lcaders, and it is scarccly rcmnrkablc tlint tho presence of 
thrcc or four mounted Officers on. an3 favourable spot should alwaj-s 
First., thc artillcry. 
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hare warned the opposing infantry of . \ d in t  mas to come. Even 
privatc soldiers were quite up to this proceeding, and directly t l i u  
little group of Oficcrs appeared one heaiil. a murmur go down tlie. 
ranks. 
Smokeless powder, which was used for the fiecontl year, in succes- 
sion a t  the miiiuuuvrcs, has brought nbout tactical derclopmciits of 
which the French liave tnkea full advantage. Guns, espccinlly when 
the batteries are posted on high ground, can fir0 o w r  the heads of 
tticir own infantry, cvcn if  it is attacking, when it is almost, at  closc 
quarters with tho enemy; thero is nothing to mask their fire; and 
qpin, when they linrc found the r;inge, there is no need for them to 
cliange pozition, esccpt to give the infautry moral sppport. On the 
defensive, the Frcuch gurinern had this question of morn1 SUj)J)Ort 
well in -Act\-, and on several occasions I saw tlicrn liolclirig their 
ground, when tlieir own iufantry ~vcrc fnlling back, until tlie assail- 
nrits had got within 1,200 yards. Wlicn necessary, also, that is, whcu 
tlie ground masked tlic objectire, they showed no hesitation in pusli-' 
iiig forward to close range. 
Kntornlly, as an infantry Olticer. wit?i little more than theoretical 
knowledge of thc other arms, I speak with difiidciicc on tlic qucstiori 
of artillery. I can only describe what I saw myself, arid i t  is possible 
that imny faults were cominittcd which escaped my notice ; but, 
f'or all tliat, wlieri wc rec:dl how infinitely inferior the artillery of 
1670, both in t:ictics : i i id  innthricl, WIIS to tlie Priissiari :irtillcry, w e  
cannot fnil to realize thc cno~mous strides that have been mndr! i n .  
both directions by tlie Freiicli artillerists since that date. How bad 
the artillery of 1870 wis very inany people hare not p t  realized ; 
how good nre tliu batteries of 1602 only the test of war will reveal, 
but we may be sure that the balance will bc,fnr more even. 
Smokeless powder, ns  used by mnsscs of artillery, docs not do 
mucli to render tlio guns less visible. Tlicre arc n l w q s  briglit, 
white flakes. of flame which immediatclj attract attention, and on 
dry soil the cloud of dust driven up I)$ tlie explosion is alma~s ccii 
frorii II long distnnce. It i s  more dificnlt, pcrhaps, than lieretofore 
to count the nuiiibcr of batteries in opposition. but tlic dark line 
seems to offer n fair target, and the burst of tlic shells might be more 
Sccurately obserrcd. 
T w o  batteries of liowitzcrs, 12-cm., were employed nt the man- 
murres. Thcsc gulls fire melinitc or uicliiiitc and cresylite skells; 
1ictn-j- as tlicy are, with huge glycerine brakes, they moved ncross 
country, and arc likely to be far more efGcient thnt the mitrail- 
leuecs, D O W  discarded, on which so much dcpcridcnce was placed by 
the lnst Napoleon and liis militnrx advisers. 
Of the cavalry, agnin, I hnvc to speak en nnuzteatr ; and in this case 
I had but few opportunities of seeing the working of the nrm in 
action. Wlierc positioris are of great, leugth, 6, 9. or even 12 miles, 
nud tlic squndi.ons maiiceuvre well out on the flnnks, it is impossible 
for the ordinary spectntor to see much of the cavalry uiilcss lie 
attaches himself to i t  pcrrnanently, Rnd ercn then i t  is often possible 
that the day innj pass by without nn opportunity for i ts  action. 
TIJE FRESCH 3fAKCEUVRES OF 1891. 
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TIIE FRESCH JIASCEUVRES OF 1891. 8ii7 
ITowcvcr, on tlic march and i n  cantonments I saw n good dcal of 
the mounted, arm, :rnd on severid occasions I hit off tho  advanced 
patrols and contact squadrons. Wlietlicr their work WIIS well dono 
or uot i t  is impossiblc for mu to say. The Oficcrs’ patrols in France 
:is a rule do not consist of nioro thaii two or threu troopers, aud 
where tlie front of tho armies is very wide, 10 or 12 miles, for 
instancc, the spectator irlio finds liirnself at somc particular point 
betxccn tlic two srmics can bc no judge ;is to wlictlicr the country is 
properly pitrolled. I noticed, Iio\vcrer, d e n  thy arniics were in 
motion towards cadi otlicy, that pnsts of nliout half :I troop, who 
sent out vcdcttcs and patrols, wort cstahlished on tlic niniii roads. 
When tlic armies had rcncliecl strikiiig distanco tlic camlry was 
scldoln to be seen within tho opposing lines, but I do not know that 
it would liavo doiic much good iu such a position. 
There aro plenty of comnianding lieiglits i n  Cliampagnc, .and n 
Staff Oficer, taking post on one of tlicsc in  perfect security, 
could 6CC as rnucli ns n wliole rcgiincnt. A t  tlic battle of Vciideurrc 
somc pretty scouting was done 011 ilc Gnlliffet’s left, arid both sidcs 
wcrc covered b~ coiitact squadrons. Heir?, however, tlicre wero no 
coinmaiidiiig heights, and tlic view was liinitcd from nlniost erery 
point. 
The Frcncli recognize the distinction bctffecn tho two scrviccs of 
exploration mid sccuritj-. To the iridcpcudcnt divisions is eritriisted 
the task of leading tho advance, dealiiig with tlic cnemy’s main body, 
nud nsccrtainirig the dispositioiis of his armies, whilst to tlic brifndc 
of armlry nttachcd to evcry corps d’armCc is assigned tli6 scrvicc of 
covering tho inarch, I n  thc prcsexit manmuvres the independent 
dirisioiis canic but once into conflict. This ivas on tho 5th Scptcmbcr, 
whilst Gcuernls dc Gallitfet and Darout wcre marching to mect cach 
other. For tliis cncouuter I iinfortiiiiatcly arrived too latc, but n full 
dcscription appeared in ouo of the French military papcrs, of which 
tlic following is n bricf siimmiirr :- 
Tlie txo divisions on t.he morliing of tlic 5th both ndranced with 
the  intention of occupying a hill near tho villagc of Colombey-les- 
deux Egliscs, this hill bcing n most important poilit, corninailding 
the  surrouuding country and tlio key to scrcral good roads. 
The 5th Division reached Cnlombcy first, nnd occupied the hill 
with i ts  tlircu bntterics of artillcrr and n dismouritcd squadron of dm- 
gooiis. TWO contact squadrons puslicd well to the front, onc of wliicli 
acted as escort to a section of saI&xs sent forward to block the liigli 
road tliioiigli n vill:ige,soon reportcd the :tpproacli of tLc enemy,moviug 
ovcr it high ridge, about ‘2: miles distnnt. The 1st Division, licre dis- 
covered, had no lcss than fire batteries, two ha-iing been :&led from 
tho corps artillery by Gcxicml de GalliHet. Tlicn ensued R rather 
long nrtillery engagement, during which n battalion of chasseurs, 
wliicli hnd mimlied 6 miles in fiftyfour minntes, rclievcd tlic dis- 
mounted dragoons and sccurcd tho occupation of Colombcy. Tho 
5th Uivision then rode forward i n  order to Iiirc its ndrersarics down 
from the hciglits opposite, and tlic 1st  Division, leaving R dragoon 
regiment to escort the  batteries, left its cover to mcet it. Both 
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8 68 THE FRESCLI NAX(EUVBES OF 1891. 
divisions tricd to gain each otlicr’s flank. and botli attacked in tlirec 
lines, a brigade in each. The 5th Llivisiori exposed its flank to tho 
five battcrics on the ridgc. and its second line was cli:irgcd by the 
dragcon regiment which had bccn left ns escort to tlie pins. The 
thrco batterics of the 5th Division changed position threc times 
during this nction ; thoso of tho 1st rernainecl on thcir commanding 
ridgc. 
The 1 s t  Division, whilst manocurring to gain the flanks of the 5 t h  
corcred abnut 2: miles a t  the tyot and gallop. 
On tho 7th, tho day of the first battle, the two carally divisions 
found themselves some 7 or 8 miles in rear of the right flank of 
Gcnernl Davout’s army. Hero tlicrc was very little cavalrr fighting 
bqond a cliargc or two in cxtcridcd order against infnntry,nntl a dis- 
nioniitcd :ittack of the 28th Dragoons of the 1st Division on the 
village of Ulnise. Anotlicr rillngo was occupicd and barricaded by 
squadrons of tlie 5th Division. 
On the (lay of the battlu of Vendenvre, tho 1 s t  Division, covering 
the right flank of thc army to wLich i t  bclongcd, drove back a cavalry 
brigade, and then, reinforced by a corps brigade, twice cl~argcd the 
attacking inf:intry in flank. The 5th Dirision, on tlie opposing side, 
was cinplojed nt first on tlic othcr flank. It first held a villagu until 
tho arrival of the infantry, for which purpose four squadrons were 
dismounted and occupied the border of a wood. It was then sent 
ovcr to the othcr wing, but, having to travcrso about 16 miles of (lit& 
cult country, it did not nrritw till the action n-iis orer. 
On thc l l th ,  during tlie advance against the masked enemy, tlie 
two divisioiis, now on the same side, niored in ndvnnco of cithcr 
wing, the 1st Division being kcpt together on a singlo ro:id, with 
Omccrs’ patrols over D wide frolit, tho 5th working in two columns. 
!l’h front-covered by the taclvc rcgiments ~vas about 30 o r  35 miles. 
On the 14th the two divisions wero united, nnd attacked tho 
enemy’s cavalry iri mass, the artillery (six battcrics) being divided 
in two groups on the flanks. Tlie divisions were reinforced by a 
corps brigade, and the wliolc force iiumbered fifty squadrons. 
In France, as clscwliore, a great deal of ndrerse criticism has  been 
showered, not so micli on tho Frcricli. cawdry as on tlie cavalry 
Generals, and it is said their action or inaction br no means FC- 
ceircd tho approvtil of tho supreme authoritics. This is a point on 
wliich 1 can say nothing. l i re  hare not licnrd tho defcnco of the 
accused. It lias bccn said tlint tho cavalry missed many opportunit.ics. 
But thc cavalry cannot bo everywhere, and when the front of battle 
cxtcnds to 7 o r  8 uiilcs it is nianifcstly impossiblo that it should 
~ J C  able to scizo cvery opportunity that offers. I can oilly say that 
there nppcars little rcluctunce to usu tlie cavalry boldly in the vcrj- 
licnrt of ttic battle, but it is very possiblc that the fact of tlio mounted 
arm bcing very seldom enrplqcd en musse a t  tho niniimuvres of the 
other arms deprives its lcaders of all opportunity of gaining 
expcricrico iri combined tactics. 
As to the general appearanco of the arm. I sliould say that it corn- 
pares well with otlicr European cavalry. It is well horsed, OIL tho 
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THE FRESOH JIAKWUVRES OF 1891. 1169 
'whole, though somewhat uneven in this respect, and tho cnirassiers 
ale under-monnted. The iinprovcmcnt in  riding is ~ e q -  marked, and 
the divisions mxnmuvred easily mid rapidly when cn  mnsse. TLc 
dmgooria arc armed with lances, but tlicir brass helmets and tho 
bright cuirasses of the heavies arc csccedingly conspicuons, catching 
tlio sun at a long distaucc. Tho liglit c a r a l ~ ,  tlio cliassours, look 
moro workmanlike, both horse and man, tlian cither, and their plain 
sky-bluo uniforms are well adapted to field scrvico. No horses under 
six years old nre allowed in tlie ranks, bnt as t h o  pcsco streiigtli of 
the regiments, as in Gcrmany, is greater than that for war, tho niiiks 
are riot thoreby attenuated. I noticed a good many sorc backs, 
principally amongst the corps crrvnlrx, and in  all prolvability due to 
the unsparing use of tho men as orderlies by the infantry cominanders. 
On tho whole, the work dono 113' the c:tvalry cannot be Anid to have 
been very heavy, but the distances a t  which tho opposing armies 
wcre placed apart was small. Nc-axtlicless from 30 to 40 iuilcs per 
diein imre often travelled br the dirisions. 
There aro otic or two points in connection with tlio cavalry Fhich 
call for special notice. France lins 110 mounted infantry, but she 
eridcutly intends to  supplement the firo cnpacity of her horscrncil. 
Them were tcnchasseur or rifle battalions engaged in the manaxvres, 
and the majority of these, a t  one time or anotlier, were employed in  
support of thc cavalry. Thcso troops, perhaps the most liighly- 
trained in the nrrny, are mngiiificcnt rnnrclicrs, equalling tho Dcr- 
baglieri in rapidity of pace arid also in cndur:iricc. 1 have already told 
you how the 5th C s r a l g  Division, a t  Colombey, was supported by a 
b:rttalion which marched 6 miles (the packs being carried h i  carts) 
under tho  hour, nnd in all the carnlry operations these auxiliaries 
wcrc used to hold important tnctical points, arid to set free the horse- 
nieu for  the shock. At tlic tiamc time, 11s yon will liayo iioticcd, 
the cavalry is considered capntlc of fightiilg on foot, and of fittacliirlg 
on foot too. 
I come next to the infantry, and I niay say a t  once that I do not 
tliinli any infantry Officer present at the minomvres can speak of 
the Preiich infantrr soldier otherwise than in terms of the Iiiglicst 
praise. The men d l o ~ ~ d  so much stc:idiricss anti endurance, they 
wcro so clicei*ful and good tempered, even a t  tlie cud of long and tiring 
d:ys, they marched so well under their heavy packs (wcighing about 
50 Ibs.), and they looked so liko fighting, that i t  was impossible not 
to admire tlicm. 0 1 1  tlic march, tlie meii w a r  the long blue- 
groy copBle, with the skirts doubled back, the lidpi, niid boots of uiuch 
the same pattern as our own, with a broad solo and a low heel. 111 
addition to his necessaries, cach Irian carries his share of the cook- 
ing appnratus belonging to liis squad, a bundlc of firewood, IL light 
entrenching tool, and il section of the tentc dhlr i .  In tho pack 
itself arc carried tlio two days' emergency ration, a pnir of white 
sp:btS, and a pair of stout hobnailed shoes, and on tho top of the 
p:ick is the shell jacket, worn in camp and cantonments. The sliocs, 
spats, and jacket liaro to bo put on immediately tho cornpanics dismiss 
after the day's work ; and this is I most practical regulation, for the 
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570 THE FRESCB JIASCEUVRES OF 1891. 
man is not only bcnefitcd by Iiaring to changc his boots, but lic lins 
also au opportunity of looking to liis feet and to his socks, or to thc 
p m e d  r:igswhicli many of thcni wear in lieu.' TlicFrcncli soldier nccds 
little nrging to induce him to look after his own 1ic:tlth and comfort. 
Directly billets werc taken np, tlie men niight bc sccu inspectin:: 
thcir clotliing, repairing. rents, looking to their foot gear, and 
generally getting their kit into order for thc ncxt dsfs msrch. This 
liabit hns, doubtlcss. sornething to do witli tlie csccllcnt marching of I 
tlic Inttdions, but it is very evident that Innch'attcntion is pnid to  
their irainirig in this inost iriiliortarit pnrticulnr. The  wcathci. 
dnring tlie maiimuvrcs was wry hot, thc tlicrinonieter scmcti;nes' 
rc:icliing 95", and even morc ; thc marclies werc long, varying from 
15 to 30 miles, the engagcmctits were nnmcrous, a i d  tlic work, with 
tlic csccption of thc outpost duty, hcavicr t h i  would gencrally be 
tlio cnsc on actual scrricc. Andyct thcro wcrc two points by which 
I was particulnrly struck : the fcw Inen who fcll out, arid the wag in 
which tlic sections of fours kept closcd up even a t  the end of a long 
march. 
'lllic msrinc brigade had R lsrge numbcr of casnnltics, but tlie 
ambulances attaclicd to'the infantry battalions, so far as my pcrsorial 
obscrvation wcrit, W C ~ C  ncvcr owr-crowdcd, nud wcrc vcry oftcn 
emptF. 
Discipline on tlic march  as strictly maintnincd, and I think that 
ns regards mohilitj-t thc b'rcrich iiihntry of to-day is in :idvnncc of 
that  of 1 S i O ;  I might sng rcry far in advaiicc if I did not bclicvo 
that tlic p o p l a r  opinion as to tho want of endurance amongst 
Napoleon's troops is bascd on insufficient eridencc. The French 
;irrriics, a t  tlic outset of tho war, moved slowly euougll, but this was 
due, I bclicrc, rathcr to Staff mismanngcment, such as de1:rycd tho 
pnssngc of Uazainc'a troops tlirauKli Jlctx bctorc thc battlc of Vicn- 
villr~ Of courso tlic march to Scdari was nn utter breakdo~n,  bat 
hg that time, to quotc tlic oIIicial account, I' succcssivc dcfcats, con- 
tinuous retreat, mid nialndministration had utterly dcstroycd tlic 
inorale and discipline of t h o  troops." 
'1% attack formation of tlio French infantry is the nest  point I 
conic to, and i t  is oric, I think, wliicli rncrits attention, ns  i t  has 
ecrtaiii iiiarkcd peculiarities. Tlic advanced guards, uudcr coFcr of 
which the rnnrcliing coluinns npproach thc cncrny's position, arc strorig, 
cspccially in artillery, three bnttcrics Icing detailed to tlic norinal 
advanced guard of a division; arid under covcr of this scrceii the 
army corps deploy for attack as singlc units; I mean by this, tliat 
thc wliole twenty-four battalions movo for\\-nrd simultaricously, 
formcd in thrcc lincs. Thc battlc docs not thorcforc procced, as was 
genernlly tlic case in 1870, by :I gradual reinforcement of tlro 
ndvauccd gnnrds ; thcrc is 110 strcngthcriirig tlic mrcen by driblcts ; 
but tlic attack tnkca tlic form of the ndrancc of a mnss of troops dis- 
posed on a narrow front and with great dcpth. In fact., tho attack 
is madc vcry milch on tlic same broad lincs ns were tho assaults of 
our own arrny in tho Pcninsnla nnd at tlie Alma. I may rccnll to 
your mcmory Wellington's countcr-stroke at Salamanca, when " EC 
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THE FRESCH MASCEUVRES OP 1891. 871 
obscrrcd,” s a p  Xapicr, I ‘  with stern contentment that the Vrench 
left wing was critircly mpnratcd from the ccntrc. The fault was‘ 
flagrant, he fixed it with tho stroke of n tliundcrbolt. A fcm ordcrs 
issued from his lips like the incantation of a wizard, niid sudderily 
the dark mass of troops wliicli corcrcd the English Hcrmnnito 
scemcd agitated br some mighty spirit ; rushing violent1~- down tho 
intcrior slope of the mountain, they entered tlio great basin amidst 
:L storm of bullcts which appeared to shear away the wliolc surfncc 
of the earth over which they were moving. Tho 5th Division irnme: 
dintcly formed on tlic riglit of the 4th. . . . Tlic Gtli and 7th 
Divisioiis. . . . wcrcrmgcdon a second line. . . . Arcsc i~c  
composed of tho light divisioiis,  pack'^ Portugucsc, ke., rcmaincd in 
licsry masses on the liiglicst ground behind them all.” 
Wlicn I conipnro the Frrlucli nttack of to-day with Wellington’s 
offcnsivc strokes, I do not wish you to understand that tlic Frciicli 
infantrj- dcpcnd upon shock tactics for success. To break nnd 
demordize the opposiiig infiintry by firc-action is their primarr 
object, and tlierc is no dirision of the assnultiiig.forcc into two bodies 
cq:h with a distinct duty, the first line to do the firing, tlic second to 
use tlic Inyonet. In fact, themain principles of their offcnsivc ttictics 
arc identical with tliosc which :~ppcm in the latest cditioii-of our own 
Ficld Escrcisc, with tlic exception that w r y  grcat stiscss is hid on the 
results to bc cspcctcd from the siruultaiicous ndvnncc of R great mass 
of nicii on a single p i n t  of tlic linc of battle. Tlic deployuicxit in 
tlircc liues prdimiiinry to t l iu  advnrico is mndc with rniicli attention 
to distances and intcrvals, nnd hurry is carcfnllq- avoided. But at 
the same time, I obscrved no iustnnccs of undue delay, nnd on two 
occasions, wbcn counter-strokes were made, tho troop6 got into posi- 
tion 1w-y rapidly nnd in cscellent order. I n  fact, the skiff of the 
corps d’nrm6c seenied perfectly familinr with tLc ar t  of linxidling 
large masses as single units. 
T h e  deplojmcrit bcing completed, ‘geneidly outside the extreme 
rnngc of thc enemy’s artillcry, thc sercral lines movc forward 
togcthor, tho first line gradually breaking np into sinallcr and 
smirller frnctioris ; tlicso fmctions gr,idually extend, and tlic firing 
line gradually thickens, uritil a t  about  1,200 p r d s  from thc position, 
the wliolc front is covcrcd b j  R srreen of men in single rank, each 
squad of t d v o  or fiftccn rifles scparatcd by an interval from those 
right aud left, and the inen moving with plenty of elbow-room. 
JSehind come tlio supports, ge~ierally in singlo rank, tlicn the bat- 
talion reserves, and in rear again, the second and third lines, and in 
fionie instances, a fourth linc, or gcncial rcscryc. Firing, whcn ou 
the offcnsivc, began, a-s R rulc, betu-ccn 1,200 and 800 yards, and 
I never obscrvcd much dclay in the advance until tbc decisive range 
--within 500 yards-was rcaclied. Uy the time the firing line lind 
rcaclied this distance, the supports axid rcscrvcs had closed up, tlic 
rjccond line was near a t  ‘Iiand, and the advance was continned by 
rushes of 60 or 70 yards. Supports and rcserres were brought up, 
m d  magazine-firing comrnenccd. The sccond linc now came forward, 
and aftcr a wry rapid tire bayonets were fixed, and with druma 
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vc:tting, nnd tho men shonting ‘I Ci Za baiomiettc,” tlic wholc line 
charged tlic position. 
Such is tlic gcneral aspect of tlic attack, and thcre aro certain 
details which arc of intcrcst. I n  tlio first placc, tlio English 
Oficcrs prcseut wero specially struck with thc good ordcr and rcgu- 
hit)- of tlic whole mommcnt. Until tho niorncnt jnst preceding 
the  assault. thc successive lines advancc at D stcmly pace, e re ry  
pnrtion of the forco prescrviug i ts  propcr interval, and tlic rncn 
keeping their dressing, not absolutely necur:ttcly, of course, but 
sufficiently to give the movement an  appearance of stivrigtli and  
cnlicsion which was most effective. Little less rcmnrkablc was thc  
abscncc of Iioise. Whistles nnd signnls nrc used by the Oficers, 
aid phouting is strictly prohihitcd. Thirdly, thc company Oficers 
in thc firing linc were left entircly to thernsclves. 1111 Oflicers dis- 
mounted when within long rifle rmge, and everyone, from tho Coni- 
manding General downward, rctniiicd tlic fiamc position during tlie 
~ I i o I c  of thc manmnvre. AS the  “Times ” correspondent S:LJS in liis 
description of one of these attacks : “ Tho wliole mass moves forward 
stcndily and silently, until, pcrhnps, 25,000 men arn iii view beneath 
us, covering tlic facc of tho country for 8 spaco of more than 
f! rnilcs in Icrigtli, aud 2,000 yards in dcpth. Scarcely n, mounted 
Officer is to be descried : bctwccn tlic various colnnins there is no 
risiblc mcans of communication. l’licrc is no shouting of orders, no 
gnllopiog. to arid fro. Tllc hugc mass of men advnuccs, directed 
:rnd ariimntcd by a sirigla will ; but this will is conimuriic:ited by n 
liniidrcd Ieadcrs, cnch working in  comlhmtion with his fellows, and 
froin the  morricnt hc pnrts company with liis irnmedi:itc snperior, left 
to eicrcisc t h o  resporisibility to which he lins bccn etlucntcd.” 
SO f a r  tlic nicclinnisrn of the Y’rcnch attack sccms wcll adaptcd to 
modern battlcficlds ; bu t  in sevcrnl rcspccts, rcry noticea1)lc at  the 
xnariacurres, tlic requirements of active scrvicc seem to bc sncri6ccd 
to :In over-scrupulous rcgnrd for the nicctics of thc pn~ndc-ground. 
First. tho importance of covcr during the advnncn is a matter to 
wliicli little :rttcntion \ x i s  pi id .  It is truo that cohesion and ordci. 
are of q u a 1  momcnt, and if cover be the  chief object of solicitude the 
attack will certainly losc i i i  dash and rcsolution. But, :it tho samc 
time, t o  neglect opportunities of avoiding tlic cncmfs iirc is to 
clirniriisli thc fire-power of the  firing linc and to rcdncc tho strength 
of the lines tha t  follow. I certainly obscrrcd vcry fcw instarices of 
either thc rcscrvcs or tlic sccoid or third lines manmuvring so as to 
utilizc tlic shelter offered by the  folds of the ground, by coppices, 
or otlicr iiatui;il features. When the mcn found thcmselvcs beliiiid 
corer, i t  was intclligently utilized, bu t  tlicrc was no skilful leading, 
and  certainly no inanifest offort to profit by the fnvourablc accidents 
of tlic Geld of tattle. AS 1 11aw said, this considerxition is rrindc 
subordinntc to ordcr and cnlicsion, b u t  me niay rcmcniber that  the 
Ficnch soldicr has always been distinguished for individuality eud in- 
tclIigcnce, qiialities which, since tho days of the lh -o lu t ionar j  armics, 
Iiarc rriadc him fmious ns n skirmisher. Tlic celebrated memoir 
written by Prince E’rederick Charlcs, long before the great x-ar, on 
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THE FRENCU JIAKCEUVRES OF 1891. . 873 
tllc art  of fighting t h o  French, rccognizcd thesc clinrncfcristics and 
taught the Germnns how to couiitcrnct them ; still. nccoiding to a 
rcccut Gcrnim writer, tlicsc characteristics 1)orc ful l  fruit in thc 
I)nttlcs of 1870. A rcmarliablc study of the 13attle of \\rocrtli, by a 
Gerninn Oficcr, Jlajor Hermanu Kunz, faroumhly criticized in tlic 
6‘ Militiir Wocl~enl~latt.” has bccn rcricwcd in the Junc number of 
tllc ‘6 Contciuporary,’’ b r  Co1011cl Lonsd;ile Hale, who thus sums up  
tlie judgment of the author: “ IVhilst claiming siiperiorit>y for his 
o\vn. Army in tlic knowledge of Geld scrvicc among tlic miik nnd filc, 
1lc poiilts out that what is tcrmcd ‘taking ndvanhgc of tlic pound 
s e p s  inhercut in tlic natnrc of the French soldicr, whilst tlic 
German finds the a r t  difficult to acquire. Under firc, tho tendelicy 
o f t h c  latter irns rathcr to gct nenr cacli othcr, RS if for mutual aid 
atid hclp, wlicrcns tlie Frcncli rclicd cnch on liirnself to rencli the 
requircd shelter.” But, ns we arc :i~v:irc. in tlic war of 1870, tlie 
bonds of disciplin? in tlic Frcnch Army lind bccorno rclased, and it is 
possible tliat tlic authorities, strniniug crcry nqrre to assure discip- 
lino in the Army of to-daJ-, have dccidcd to cutrust to tlic natnrnl 
nptitudc nud intclligcncc of the Officers and rncn tlic task of utilizing 
corer mlicll thcy l i a ~ c  to fitcc thc firc of an enemy. 
Sccoactly, in tlic ezidcavour to msintain order, intcrmls, mid 
distniiccs. not only was covcr disrcgardcd, but thcrc was a dc1ibcr:itc 
avoidnncc of all intermingling of sections, companics, or battalions, 
:rlld this, if our own cspuricucc in t.lie Crimca and those of both 
l’rclicli niicl German’s in 1870 arc of tho slightest value, inndc thc 
infantry :ittacks mi ribsolutcly unre:il picturc of wlint must inevitably 
take plnco on a modern battle-ficld. 
Tlic firing linc, when a decisive attack is intcndcd, must bc mnin- 
tained a t  full strength, and w c  know, from tlic history of the German 
campaigns, that in order to do this, not only company will havc to bc 
pilcd upon company, brrt battalion on battalion. Conftision is iucvit- 
able; hut tlie Frcnch, unlikc thc Gcrmaris, sccm to considcr tlie tagk 
of orpriizing, or, at Icast, of minimizing, this co~ifusion, Iiopcless ; a t  
all cvcnts, I observed no attcmpt to accustom the Oficers and men 
t o  tlic cmbarrassmcnts and pcrplcsitics of such a situntion. Duriug 
tbc last stagc of an attack, tho two opposing firing lines were often 
to bc sc‘cii, stauding in tho open, blazing away a t  cnch other n t  200 
or 300 yards rangc, with tho lincs beautifully dressed, and tlic sceond 
line lying down n short distancc in  thc rcar. This ccrtainly did 
not agrec with eitlicr what I l i a ~  read or sew1 of war. Of course, it 
is just at this stage that tlic unreality of peace ni:mmunw particularIy 
obtrudes itsclf. Where tlierc arc no cnsunltics, no gnps in tlic ianlrs, 
wlierc tlic troops cannot npproncli within n ccrtnin tlist:ince, n n d  
wlicrc tllc decision rcsts on tho fiat of an umpire, wlio, linviriq to t:iku 
many things iuto consirlcrutiou and to reccioc many reports, may tnkc 
a long time to malie up his mind, tlic Gvc miuutcs, beyond x-hich 
those wlio haye c.spcrieucc of  brcccliloadrr fire tell u s  that tLc crisis 
of an infantry figlit canriot be prolonged, easily run on to 11:ilf an 
lioiir, and tlic situation bccomcs absolutely unlike anything tliat is 
Iikcly to occur in nctua.1 battle. 
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874 THE FRESCH SIASCEUVRES OF 1891. 
In connection with the  formatioL for  attack is the question of fire- 
discipline, and I think that, however high’ the praisc tliat tlieir 
iidmirers may award to the Ft*cncli soldiers of 1870 for tlie skill tlicy 
sliowcd in niakilip use of ground, the dcspcrate teiiacity with wliicli 
they licld their ground, the brilliant dnali arid precision with which 
their counter-strokes were csecutcd, a ~ i d  tlio order i n  which with- 
drnwcls and retreats were carried oat, no one can say R word in 
cstenuntion of the recklesg waste of amrnunition nnd absolute n-ant 
of control in the firing lirio. 
To-day, so fiir as the mnnmuvrcs teach ua, the military authorities 
1i:ive introduced :i remarkable rcforrn. 
Up to the crisis of the attack, tlie firc is by ~ol lcy  alonc, and these 
vollc~-s \VCI*C ncver ragged ; ” tho Inen were well in hand, words of 
command clearly given, and raiigcs and objectives nlw:iys indicated. 
Tlic men, :IS a general rule, nltercd tho elovation ns ordered, but I 
think that the section niid squad leaders, who gnve the executive words, 
jxiid 11i01-e attention to firing a good volley than to sccing that the 
objective was understood. SO csscntinl is .it considcrcd that every 
rifle should be tired simultaneously, that  over and oTer again I saw mexi 
firing who coiild not possibly see the enemy, with n biisli or R tree a 
few p3rds in front; i d ,  in this respect, nll csertiou of individual in- 
telligcucc is evideutly sacrificed to tlic great ciid of maintaiiiing the 
wry strictest control :~nd  the tightest disciplinc. The position while 
liriiig was gcxici-ally good, wlictlier on tlic knee or standing, and the 
170 rounds that the inen now cxpcnd 011 tlie ranges is a very grcat 
:idvnncc on tlie mcagrc allowance issued-30 to 50 rounds-previous 
to ISTO. ’ Long-runge firing, that is, a t  ranges oyer 900 ynrds, I 
scldoin saw; but on sei-era1 occasions, thc supports and rcserves, 
served by the uiidulations of tho ground, fired vollcys over tho lieads 
of the firing line. I xnriy notice here that endeavours to torn tlie 
cuorxiy’s flank were iilniost too constant, a practice very different to 
the direct shock tactics of of 1870. Therc arc many other points, as 
r e p &  tlic attack of tlic infantry, on which I should be’glad to 
dilate, did tlic ‘lioui. ndmit ; bu t  my time is limited, and I will onls 
add one remark, wliicli, perhaps, may S C ~ V C  as a uscful anrning to 
. joung Officers. WR hnvc been accustotnetl in Eiiglnnd, cverj  now 
and then, to hear a good deal nbont ‘*drill and discipline.” The 
words, coupled togctiicr, hare bccn made the tes t  of many an in- 
spection oration; at all evcnts, i t  hm been imprcsscd upon every 
Cadet, on Iiis leaving Sandliurst, that  they should be his watch-words 
during his rnilitary career. Now, the  first thing that strikes on0 on 
seeing 110,000 troops deplojcd for aetion is how absolutely essential 
TO an army, ci-en on a modern battle-field, arc st.cndy drill and the 
strictest discipline. Until I saw 25,000 deploy for action in  II very 
short space of time, i t  liad never been so p c t i c a l l y  brought liomc 
to me what an important phase of an engagement such a deploy- 
ment is, ncd h o w  thorough a kno~-lcdgc of closc-order xnwenient8, 
what readiness in handling their commsnds, Officers of all ranks niast 
possess, if it is to be affected without undue dclay and the very greatest 
. coufusion. Again, the order, tho quiet, and the precision of thc  advance 
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TUE FRESCH JIAX\'(FU\TES OF 1891. S i 5  
convey an appcarancc of strengtli which cannot fail to ham its due 
cffect, and I cannot b u t  tliiiik that  thc strict discipline maintained by 
the E'rcncli at every stago of tho operation i s in  accord:inco with every 
teaching of history and espericnce. Of course figliting in an enclosed 
country nt home would iiaturally Lcar n very different aspcct to fight- 
ing  on tlic grcnt opcn and unobstructed spaces ou the Conticent. 
There, positions arc clcarly marked, tlic  imp shows tlicni ; here, cvc,n 
at Aldcrshot, it  is  cxtrcmcly diflicult citlier to guess or disco\-er 
wIicro tlic cncniy is actually postcd; aud, wliile tlic work of the 
cardry and advanced guards would be tenfold more arduous, n 
General \vould Ii3r-c tho rery grcatest difliculty in knowing wlicri aurl 
wlicro to deploy his masscs for n.dccisive attack. In fact, 1shgl:ind 
is so tliickly wooded, nud sq covered with Iicclge-rows, that  tlic issuc 
of R battle would dcpcnd more upon the iiitclligent'lcnding of tlio 
firing-line, tho usc of corer, minor flank attacks, and tho closu co- 
operation of tho battalion rcscrvcs, tlian on the siniultancous attack 
of an enormous number of men. It is wcll to bcar this in mind \vlicii 
comparing o u r  own with Continental tactics. 
Arid tlicrc aro otlicr poiuts connected with the Frcuch Army as to 
wliicli TO should bo careful in 1nnkiiig comparisons. Katioiinl 
cliaractcristics should never bo ignorcd by students of war, and i t  
would be unwisc to  set down the troops of anothcr Power as ineflicient 
IJccause they pay littlo nttcntion to matters by wliicli we s c t  much 
store. Englishmen who sec tlio Frcncli and otlier troops in tlicir 
ordinary grrisons,  route-marching, on guard duty, or " w:ilking 
out," arc rntlicr apt to write them down indifferent bccausc they do 
not compare well with our  ow11 men in siiiartness and appcaranco; 
mid wlicn tlicy obscrrc sentries 1o:ifing on their posts, slo-icnly 
saluting, troops marching without keeping stcp, :md liarncss old ant1 
unpolished, tlicy arc led to tliiiik that whcri such things arc pcrmittcd 
very strict idcas of duty cannot exist. I may rcfcr particularly to  the 
French close-ordcr drill and the ninnnal of arms. According to  o u r  
idcas nothing could Lo worso than either. So long as the iuen get 
into their placcs, so long as tho rifles are brought to tlio shoulder, it 
docs not matter how it is donc. To sco n French battalion foriniiig 
fours or 1)resciiting arms would makc the hair of an English scrgcaiit- 
major stand ou end. But, for all that, althougli the movements of 
tlic individual men h a w  not tlic sliglitcst prctcnco to precision or 
siriartncss, tho movements of the battalions arc r e ry  rapidly csccuted, 
a n d  changes of formation aro made with thc grcatcst rcadiiicss. 
Sti l l  i t  is very cridcnt that  no niorc is  cxactcd from the men than 
that they should bo able to march without losing distancc or iritcrval, 
and  to  find their places in tho  ranks without eonfusion or delay. It is 
whcn the attack begins tha t  steadincss, regularity, and strict disci- 
Tlino nro  first apparent; and wlicn tlioy aro actually engaged oii thc 
held tho French soldiers nrc Lest i n  hand. Directly deploj-znent 
takes place everjtliiug tightens up. The slnckncss and shuffling 
observable a t  other times disappear at once, giving placo to silcncr, 
nlcrtncss, and precision. In fact all otlicr branches of military traiii- 
ing, esccpt marching, arc mado subordinate to dutics under firo ; and 
YOL. XXXYI. 3 s  
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876 TEE FRESCH llAN(EUVRES OF 1891. 
it‘ appears to  be considcrcd in  France tha t  inattention to details on the  
paradc-ground is not. incompatible with the strictest discipline in 
tho field. . Nor is precision in closo-ordcr drill and i n  tho m?nual of 
.arms understood as tho necessary foundation for prccision of move- 
ment, good order, and subordination, in battle formations. 
Thc snmo observations will apply also to the somcmhat easy rela- 
tions bctxeen Officers and ‘men. In the first placc, Franc0 is a 
repnhlic; secondly, numbers of tho men in the ranks arc socially 
equal to tho Officers ; thirdly, tho ordinary usages of militarx 
ctiquette arc nevcr strictly cnforced; whcn speaking to an Officcr the  
men do not always stand to  attention, and tho Officers seem perfect11 
indiffercnt to their attitude. At tho samc timo I observed no want 
of respect and no unduo familiarity j and although it appears strango 
t o  us to he& an  Oficcr say to  a corporal, “Will you plcaso firo D 
.volley in that direction,” yet when irregularities occurred thcro mas 
no lack of dccisil-e langnagc. I may obscrrc, as a point of intcrcst, 
that  I Iiavc been told by Officcrs who took part in thc Crimean 
campaign that  the characteiistics peculiar to the Frcnch troops of 
to-day astonis1ii.d the English Army when the Allies first met in 
1854. 
Outposts during tho manconvres wcre not, I bclicvc, invariably 
established, and, when they werc, no night cnterprises mere allowed 
between the hours of 9 and 4. I do not know whctlicr tho piquets 
xerc  usually ~vithdrawn to cnntonmcnts a t  0 o’clock ; on two occn- 
sions I saw thcm making preparations to spend tho night in bivouac. 
.Tho duty of obscrration was carried out in mucli the samc fashion 
.as our own-doublo sentries and small recruiting patrols of a non- 
commissioned officer and a couple of men. Tho piqucts often made 
shcltcrs for themselves of straw, very quickly put togcther. On tlic 
march and during tho cngagcmcnts I did not notice much nsc made 
of either flanking or fighting .patrols. Whether tho formor arc of 
Tcry much usc in  an open country i n  thcsc dajs of long-raiiging 
<rifles is a doubtful question: To bo of any d u e  they must mow at 
SO0 or 1,000 yards on tho flank of the line of march, a thing in  itself 
almost impracticable, and a fcw monntcd infantry would bc far mom 
cffcctiw. The fighting patrols, that is, scouts thrown out to sccuro 
the flanks of the battalions, especially when on tho defensive or moving 
overbroken ground, Kcre, on more than one occasion, conspicuous by 
.their absence; on others, it mas not until the battalion liad bccii somo 
timo cstablishcd in position, although the flanks n-crc cxposcd and tho 
ground beyond hidden, that myone thought of taking this precaution 
against surprise. 
I harc allndcd to thc unrcalitics which obtruclcd thcmsclns in tlie 
field, espcsially during the infantry attacks. Many of thcsc werc due, 
it secmed to me, to tho incxpcricncc or  insufficiency of tho Umpire 
Staff. S-e-ienty 0fficers.were cniployed on this duty, and this number 
was perhaps too r’cw ; howover this may be, tho umpiring was unsatis- 
factory, .rcry long delays taking placo before a decision mas nrrived 
at, even in  localities whcrc tho troops engaged wero in .no great 
strength. . There is a very marked difference in  this respect betmeen 
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THE FREKCH JIAXUCUTRES OP 1891. .877 
thc French and Germans, mnch in favom of thc latter; and it is 
certain that oulj by thc mpid, intcmcntion oE Umpircs ou tho spot 
can tlio stages of an attack at  pcace manccuvrcs bc made to reprcsept 
thc rolling backwards and forwards of tho fight, the partial succcss 
hcre, tbc rctrcat them, thc hcary rcinforccmcnt at one point, the lieayy 
los~cs a t  another, which arc tLc invariablc features of thc breech- 
loader battle. 
Thc infantry cnti-enehing tools were seldom nscd; ncver on tlic 
attack; but points on wliicli to rally, and battery cmplaccrnents, werc 
constructcd by tho cnginccrs. Villngcs wcro invariably put in a stato 
of defence, wdls irupro\-cd, slicltcr trcnclics t h r o n  up, aud thc roads 
bnrricadcd ; but this riork was lcft to tlic snppcrs. I iiiay notice hero 
that tho front occupicd by tlic armies wlicn in lino of battle ivas very 
long, nwraging, Then Gcncrals Darout and dc Gallifict wcrc cngagcd 
against cacli othci; from 7 to 8 miles for 50,000 men. Tlic corps 
cl’armdo wcrc kcpt i d 1  conccntratcd, but them wrc  ’often gaps 
bctween them, partially occupicd, it is tmc, b~~nrtillcrj-, but still gaps 
for all tlint. 
No clcscriptioxi of tho French troops would be satisfactorj without 
Eomo reference to discipline, for, as sou aro awnre, history cliargcs 
their prcdcccssors of 1870 with much lnxity in this rcspeet. 
Xanoonn.cs arc not n rcry screrc tcst of disciplinc, but I do not 
think that n soldiei; mising freely with tho troops on thc march, on 
thc field, on tho outposts, and in qnartcrs, can fail to gct soxnc idea 
of thcrclntions that exist bctwccn 01Eccrs and men, and also of the 
1vq-  in  which duty is pcrforrucd. Spcakixig for myself, I s a ~  no 
sj-mptoms either of insnlordinntion, or disrespcct, or carclcssncss in tlic 
cxccution of orders. Tlic Frcnch rcgimcntal OIIiccrs look iwll after 
tlicir men, cspccially in cantonxncuts; t h y  treat them in n  cry 
fatlicrly manncr ; rnucli good fccling appcnrs to csist bctwccn all 
ranks, nnd mliilo disciplinc is strict and irrcgularitics checked with- 
out hcsitation, tho Oliiccrs and non-cornmissioncd officcrs, so far as I 
could see, a1wq-s attend to  tlic comfort of their men bcforc cousidcring 
tlieir orn. It is true that many of the non-commissioned onicers, 
who nrc vcry young, appear shy of asscrting thcir authority and want 
tho Iiabit of giving decided orders, but 1 ncvcr dctcctcd the lcnst 
tcndcncy to insubordination or slackness on thc part of tlicrank and 
file. Under tlic most trying eircumstanccs t h y  wcrc ful l  of good 
liuxiiour, and tlic Officers sct tlicm nn esccllcr~t cxamplc. Tkc accou- 
~iiodation in tho littlc towns nxid dlngcs,  which had gcncrnlly tlic 
troops qua’;tcrcd on tkcm in tlic proportion of two or eve~i inorc 
soldiers to ci.ch licad of thc population, was ly no means luxurious, 
and oven tlic Hcndqunrter Stalf had to put up mith rcry rongli farc. 
But thcrc was no grumbling to bc licard ; and tlic Ofieei*s, as a body, 
took wry kindly to their mimic campaigning, and sliomcd iiiuch 
interest in  tlic operations. 3Caps (R.F., l/SO,OOO) and field-glasses 
were carried, and nscd, by cvcry regimental Ofiecr. 
Tlicro arc many other  points wliicli I sliould linvo likcd to discuss, 
bu t  time will not pcriiiit mc to do niorc tliaii rcfcr to tlicin. Thc 
use of a balloon by a Commanding General \\-as n iiovcl fcaturc. At 
3 x 2  
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878 ‘THE FRESCII JfAS(%UVRES OF 18’31. 
the  cngngemcnt at  Colombcy, Gcncral dc Gnlliffct took up his posi- 
tion in tho car, scnding down liis ordcrs to fcrrajirnitr bj- tclephone. 
The ball0011 kcpt wcll outsidc extrcnio artillery range, and, tho 
country being so opcn, must h a w  n5urdcd n widc ricw. It lind this 
disadmntngc, tlint it  disclosctl tlic position of the Coiiimandcr, and 
thc probnblc ccirtrc of liis line. A t  Vciidcurrc, tlic balloon cliarigcd 
sidcs, and joincd thc iittack. Tclcgrnplis arid tcleplioncs werc cs- 
t c n s i d y  uscd during tlie inancrurres ; :is ivcro lamp signalt, both by 
dax and night. Thc commissariat dcpartmcnt causcd no complaint. 
Tho rations \vcrc plcntiful and of good quality, but I Iicard tlicre m-as 
some grumbling as to tlic \vant of water on ono or tlro occasions. 
Tlic cnipty wagons v-cre scnt back to thc  bnsc of supplics by night, 
and tho roads yc rc  thus left free for tlic ninrcliixigcolu~ii~is by day. A 
great part of tho supplics vcrc procurcd bj- requisitions, scnt in somc 
t h o  prcvious to tlic Iiianmuvro pcriod, but ficld bnkcrics were nm- 
ploycd, n ~ i d  Loth t h y  and sninll licrds of oscn nccompniiicd tlio 
troops. I do  not think t l int  any scrcro strain was put on tho  supply 
dcpartnicnt, nnd tlic Inanmuyrcs nlIbrd vcry littlc insight into tllc 
cnpncitx of tlic Intcndnncc for providing for tlic wants of tho vast 
arrriics Frnncc could pu t  into thc  .field i n  case of war, pcrliaps tlic 
I n  conclusion, I m:LF say tlint nix impressions of the French Army 
may appear nltogcthcr too fa~ouixble, and IOU may think that I liave 
lookcd at ercrytliing through rose-tinted glnsscs. I was glad to SCC‘, 
howcvcr, that an Englisli artillcry Omccr, \vliorn I lrnd not tho 
plcasurc of mccting n t  tlic nianmiivrcs, appcars, judging from n rcry 
interesting papcis in tlic lioynl Artillcry Institution Journal, to ngrcc 
witli nll thc conclusioiis a t  which n-c infnntry Officcrs nrrivcd. But  
thcrc arc pcoplc 1~110,lookingLack a t  tlic mismanngcmcnt and crrors of 
tho p a t  war, will not bclic\-c that  a Frcncli :irrny can bc nnything but 
rottcn at tlic corc. I will only remind sncli critics that Iron hIoltlic’s 
campaigns nrc now almost a matter of nncicnt liistorj ; tha t  the Prcncli 
Army lias becn tlrorouglily rcorganircd ; and, also, I would bid tlicn: 
rcmcmber that tlic French regular troops, dcspitc tlic mediocrity of 
thcir leadcrs, thcir want of practical training, thcir faulty. organiza- 
tion, and tlicir long scrics of dcfcats, fouglit from first to last ivitli 
splcndiil couingc. IIom near tlicy werc to bcirig victorions in more 
than onc of tlic grcnt bnttlcs i n  August, 1870, crcn German writcis 
1iaw not licsitntcd to O W X I .  Thc ‘‘ Contcmporary” nl ticlc I harc alrcady 
alludcd to is n cnsc in point. “ 1110 morc cIoscly,” writes Colonel 
IIalc, “ tho cpisodcs of the battle arc studicd, the greater tlio admira- 
tion with which thc  Frcncli privatc soldicrs and rcgimcntnl Oficcr 
must bc rcgardcd as combatants. Tlic purc-bred Frenchman, as well 
as tlic Turco and Zoun~c, foaglit splendidly. The Inrgc numbcr of 
O ~ c c r s  on the nctirc list anlongst thc rcgimcntal lenders u-ould in  no 
way account for thc stubbornncss with which, whcn fighting a losiiig 
.battle, they yicldcd tl iu ground inch by inch; nltliougli it may l inw 
contribntcd to  kccp tlicm togcther when, likc lioris at  bay, they 
suddcnly csclrnngcd the 1.61~ of dcfcucc for thnt of offcncc, and, 
springing 011 tlic foe, drovc hiin back in licadlong flight to scck 
most dificult of all military opcr a t’ 1011s. 
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THE FRESCU JIASCEUVRES OF 1891. S i O .  
The pcrccntngc of losscs is onc . safety in ilic woods nnd vincjnrds. 
of tllc bcst critcrions of fighting stnminn. I n  tlic Frcncli rcgimcnts, 
:Ictircly cn,o:iged, this pcrcentngc rniigcs from 29 np to 93.1, which 
1attcr practically mcans nnnihilation., On tho Gcrmnn sido thc liighcst 
rcgirncntnl pcrccntnge is onlF 37.62. 
German Oficcr of the  very h i g h s t  rank say, BS lic nftcrrvnrds did, 
‘ We were within ncc of’ losing tlio battle j but tlio Frcnch did not 
knon- it, nnd I hope tlicy ncx-cr maj.’ ” 
A t  the samc timc, I do not wish sou to go nwny wit11 the idea 
t h a t  I Lclicvo tlic Frcnch .Army to bo n perfect military ninchinc. 
’L’hcrc is mnch pertaining to tlic cflicicncy of thc nrmy for  war 
towards which tlic manocuvrcs do notliing to cnliglitcn us. Do 
the Goiicrals pull wcll tcgcthcr? Do tlicy posscss ixiitiatiye? Can thc 
artillery shoot? Arc tho iufnntry good ninrksmcn ? Ucre tlic ninn- 
aurrcs nrc no guide wlintcrcr. Nor wcrc t h y  altogctlicr frcc from 
tactical blundcrs; bu t  I rcrr much doubt i f  nriy mmcouvres, i n  any 
country \ilintevcr, pased off witliout giving many gportunitics for 
criticism. Kcithcr did the Oficcrs alwars displny cnpncitr for 
command nud thorough kno\vlcdgc of tlicir duty. But amongst n mass 
of iiicii i t  is impossiblo tliat all should linrc rcaclicd the snmc Icvcl; 
tlicrc must bc somo distirignislicd Ly superior cncrgy nnd decision, 
otlicrs wlio wcrc ncrcr born to lend nicn in action. 
’ To dilnto on tlic sliortcomings I obscrvcd xould scarcclr lic profit- 
able-“ w e  nrc xiom of us infnlliblc, cycn tlic joiingcst of us ”--and in 
manmuvrcs as i n  war mistakes and blundcrs arc incritnblc. Nor, 
:lfter tlic plcnsnnt tiinc spcnt i n  Chnmpngnc, \voiild such n. task be n 
congcnid onc; and I prcfcr to tnkc this public opportunity of 
acknowledging, in the  nnmo also of my brotlicr Olticcrs, the courtesy 
nnd kindncss which mndc cvcrjtliing so smootli for us. 
Onc thing xiiny ccrtninly bc sn;d of tho Frcncli Staff, and this is that 
thcy Iiarc poi-cd tliemsclrcs fully equal to  tlic task of concentrating, 
fccdirig, nnd moving 100,000 mcn in n confinctl space, niid also in  
dispersing tlicni without delay to thcir rcs~icctirc gawisons. 
It must be put donxi to tlicir crcdit tha t  tlic mnuauvrcs, cstensioc 
as thcy wcre, passed off without n single hitch. 
IVell,” hc ndils, “might a .  
Tlic CIIAIRMAS : J h j o r  Ilendcrson’s Iccturc diEercrs from other lecturcs dclivcrcd 
in this Institution, lcc;iusc, ulieriw soulc of thcui arc almost bristling with pcints 
wliick girc rlsc to discussion nnd argumcnt, in tlic Iiopc of clinngiiig tlic opinions of 
thc lcctiircr, this of JInjor 1[cnderzori’t, irliicli I call 3 rcrj  ndinirablc Iccturc, 
rccitce onl! Iiisomn cspcriciicc of \ h a t  Iic saw of tlic French niaiimurrcs last jcar, 
and tlic o iinions IIC nrrivcd at. I do not supposc my of iis think that wc nrc 
going to  ehangc t~iosc opiuions hr w1i:it any of 11s m:y liarc sccn; ncrertliclc9s 
there arc gcnllcnicn in thc room ~ 1 1 0  know 3 good dcal nbout Forcign armies, nnd 
1iarc nttcndcd tlic iiiaumurrcs of different countries, and I hope tlic lecture just  
clclirercd will iuspirc incinbcrs with 3 tlcsiro to  ndd to tlic amount of our know- 
ledge on this rubjcct, €0 as to carry out tlic principles which wc all liarc most truly 
:it lieart, riz., hon- to prcparc our own count rpc i i  for succcasful vnrfarc. 
General Sir A U C ~ I ~ U A L U  A I S O S  : I think I inn! €3)’ this lias been onc of 
tlic best lcclurcs 1 cvcr heard, and onc Eingdarly tuggcstirc. Tliere nrc 
ninny things in it wliicli iiinkc one think. I sne parlicularl~ struck with tlic 
occovnt of the mode in aliicli tlic French preparcd for thc attack. I t  is such a 
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sso THE FRESCH JIAX'(E:UVRES OF 1891. 
singular contrast to that wliich n-:i3 carricd out in tho 1st campaign by tlic Germen 
drniy. It showcd 3 most careful orrnngemcnt of ercvthing bcforc tlic actual 
attack was dclircrcd; not thc hurry, into oftcn disunit.cd oction, tliot WM 60 frc- 
qucntly tliecnsc in the cnmpaign of 1670, in o d c r  to support an attack made, 
nitliout orders, by nn ndrancc y a r d  with n siiiall body.of men. It B C L ' I I ~ ~  to mc 
tha t  this is a ruattcr of tlic grcatcst importancc, nnd which ouglit to bc most cam- 
fi i l l j  gono into. I cannot liclp thinking that in tliia particular the Frcncli nn, 
cntircly upon the right track, nnd tho onc which will be found in thc cnd to bc b j  
far tlic most cffcctirc, ond Icading to tho lenst loss in moilcrn bnttlc. 
Can tho lecturer girc u9 
any i c h  of tlic diffcrencc in Iiciglit bctwccn tlic two ticrs of guns? Can he tcll u3, 
rouglily elicaking, what \rus thc minimum diffcrcncc iri nltitudc bctwccn thc guns 
and the distancc from the front to  the rcor linc ? Onc raw of guns aaa  domi D 
slopc, of coursc, nud one behind it. 
Colonel FUASEI~ :  should liko to  nsk one question. 
Major LIESDEIEOS : One ivna on tlic ridgc, nnd tlio othrr in thc rdlc~-.  
Colonel F n ~ s ~ r r  : A considcrnble dijtancc bclow. 
Blnjor IIESDERSOS : I rcmcrnbcr onc occasion whcn it wag rcry.clistitictlymnrh-cd 
-nt the battlcof Colonibe , ahcrc tho top ticr was utlcast liiOfcct nbovo tlic lowcr 
ticr, if  I rcmcinbcr, and t t c  lomr tier was at least 600 or 600 jarils to tlic front,. 
Whcri they wcrc in two tiers, Incrcr  enw thcm r c r j  close togctlicr. I should tllinlr 
thcy w r c  nlrrajs \rcll orcr a quartcr of R mile apart. 
C'olOnd J?U'urSEn: %%st was the diffcrcnce bctwecn tlic heiglite? 
3Iajor IIESDE~SOS : I50 fcct on one occasion that I rcmcinbcr. 
Coloncl FXISEU: Can 1011 say whether jou arc pcrfcctly ccrtain that tiic Frcncli 
bntterics carricd the whole w i g h t  of scrricc ammunition? 
3lajor ~IESDEESOS : I did not inquirc into that. 
.Colonel FIXSEE: That i3 n vcr - important point, indccd, i.e., wlieth'cr thcrc 
~ c r c  30 c r t .  bcliind the liorscs. b i d  they move, for prictical puriioscs, quicklj- 
ci iou~li  for tlic i n h t r y  morcmcnt ? I mi not spikii ig of tlic IIorrc Artihry. 
3kjor IIESDE~SOS : h,yc3, certainly. 
'Coloncl F~ASEE:  Wliat distancc was tlic balloon froni tho Gcld b:ittcric3 at thc 
time t h y  wcrc supposcd to bc firing a t  it, whcn Gcncnil dc Galliffct was in it ? 
3lajor H~suensos  :W o  mcasurcd with 3 range-Gndcr, and I think irc calcu- 
latcd about 5,500 znctrcz. W c  mrc bcliiiid tho gun3, but ao took tlic clbtancc 
with on0 of llic littlc wntcli mnge-finders.' 
lh&niral SlIt Es_rsuns O~ruAsssY :J h y I  bo nlloacd to ask one qucstion? This 
is tlie first tinic manccurre3 Iiorc bcen carricd out with thc iisc of siiiokclcas powdcr, 
nud I n o d d  liko to ask what was your opinion ns to its gcuc~i l  cffcct, vhcthcr i t  
facilitated ol)cntions, or cnablccl tlicm to  carry n largcr quantity of ammunition? 
Wlint mas tlic adrantngc which \ms obtained by tlic EC of sinokelcss powder 
throughout tlic opcr~tions ?
Gcncid GOODESO~;OII : Thcrc is one thing for wliiclincmust ccrtdnly wclcomc the 
Icctiirc. Jhjor ncndcrson rntherdistinctly,instcad of lcndinn us m , o s  rrchnrc eome- 
timcs bcen 1cd ou, tondiiiirc ercrjtliing t ~ i a t  wc Ecc, nnct to7anicnt thc dinicultJ- of 
getting it oursclres,lias pointed l o  tlic diffcrcncc bctrrceiimorcmcnts as practised in 
our own country with our own Army and tlioso rnrricd on in France. A s  to tho  out- 
conic of the i i i a u ( ~ u ~ r c ~  in Fruicc, i t  sccms to nic that thc nttcntion of thcir Staff niuat 
Iiarc becn dircctd in the liiglicit dcgrcc to coutcnding with tlic enormous dificulty 
of inoring sucli liugc nixscs of men, and that tlic points the lecturcr ha3 callcd 
attciition to, of discipline uud EO forth, aould bcpoin t~  tlrat thc Frcncli Staff ~iindc 
a grmt deal of, bccausc thcy fclb that crerjthing sliould be subordinated to gctting 
tlicir large unssc3 of nicn into position with odcr  and rcgulority. l low fa- wc 
should go cntircly for that, haririg rcgard to tLc siiiallcr number of men with 
ahicli wc aliall liarc to opcrate, nnd how f3r a c  slioiild bc led to disregard what 
r e  ujiinlly do rcpwd, sccking corm, and adopting our morcmcnls to tlic esigencics 
of tlic occasion, IS a qucstion which I think tlic lccturcr lins donc wcll in lcnring to 
oiir dkcrction. Tlicrc arc onc or two questions that I wanted to ask tlic lecturer, 
first. whcthcr Eigiialliiig ~ 3 3  much prxtircd in tlicsc iiiniimrrcs. I'crhap3 Iic cnn 
tell u s  riicthcr lie SL\Y that usc madc of sigiiallinn in the field which r c  so often sco 
nttcmptccl in tliis couutrx. ~ I C  113s not mentionecfit in hi3 Icctmc. ~ ~ c a h o  rcfcrs to 
. 
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THE FRESCII 31AXUXVRES OF 1891. ’ 881 .. 
a map, but if Iic would kindly st.ntc what tlic scalo of tho map was which was in ubc 
by th,: Olliccrs in the field it uodd bo of somc ndrsntagc, and nlso what was tho . 
inntcrial on which tho maps acre  printed, wlictlicr thick or thin paper, linen, or 
any other subetancc. Thc wntcr-supply WC liarc been told was n diflicultr; that  
is to suy, tlic countrr was rcry ill supplid. I sliould liko to know u little uo rc  in 
detail ns to how the supply wm obtamcd, both in camp and on tho march. Alao 
pcrhaps the lecturer will tell us, with regard to  tlic Unipircs rcfcrrcd to, ww tho 
eystcm follomd,which i3 usual in tliie countv, of haring Umpire3 attaclicd to  cnch 
side, or WPB thcrc any attempt to plncc Umpme bctwccn tlic combatants, or a3 i t  
were bctwecn tlic arrici ,  or bctwccn tlio tFo wings of cucli forcc, to giro direction8 
and decisions, im artinlly to onc side o r  the othcr, ns bctwccn tho oppojing forces 
in any section o f  thc ficld, rather than to liar0 Umpircs attaclicd to cncli army, 
tho nttacking and defending, who haw to  comparc notcs rrftcrward3 nnd come to  I) 
dcciaiou? I sliould liLo to knon- which srstciii thcro i3 3 tcndcucy to follow in 
Xrancc. 
Thc CIIAII~XU : T~dica  nd gcntlcmcn, a8 no other Oniccr &hcs to makc nny 
rcmnrks, I will not detain you wry long. I hare bccn wry much intcrcetcd in 
what 31ajor IIcndcrson has said nbout thcsc manmurrcs, nnd hi3 criticisms eccm to 
bc r c r j  much irhat 3 g c a t  many of us liarc gathcred from rcports in tho prcss and 
clscwlcrc. Tlicro arc certain minor points, such as tlic morcments of patrols 
on thc  flanks of columns, with which ns details RC nccd not conccrn oursclres. 
l l ioy niust rary Kith the country, tlic nation, tlio enemy, thc wcathcr, nnd with 
manr  otlicr considerations. Sixuilnrly, ns to  tlio sgstcm of carnlry csploration, 
ahcthcr i t  is adrisnblo to distinguish tlio c a ~ a l v  uacd for rcconnaisbanco from 
tha t  uscd for o5cnsiro or dcfcnsivc purposcs ie a difficult point to dccidc. I was 
much. struck with what Xajor IIcndcrson Inid about thc arrangcmcnt in which 
crcrjthing wa3 put forxard, and I noticcd inysclf the enmo tlling when 1.m- 
attcnding thc Austrian 3Innocurrca in 1SSG. Thcrc also tho nrrangcmcnt ~ 3 8  first- 
ratc. So far ns wc forcigii Officcre wcrc conccrncd, wo canio in daily from thc 
manccumcs in thc coursc of tho afternoon ; nnd on tho tollorring morning at G 
o’clock wo had 3 lithographcd paper put upon thc table, showing exactly what thc 
Umpircr liad ordered ns thc result of tlio prcrioushj’s nction, togctlicr with a mop 
of tlic couiitrr in which thc manaurrcs mcro to bc cnrricd on, showing all tho 
roads. Ercrjtliing was to scalc, EO tliat wlicn TO vcrc rcady to rido out and 8co 
thc fight, RC kncw csactly whcrc to go to. Similnrly at thc commcnccmcnt of tho 
day’s manccurrc’ thcrc \%-as no ehouting, no buglc sound. Thc GcncraI OlIiccr p r o  
llis ordcrs quietly. Tlioso orders wcrc conveyed though  thc UriKadicr to tlic 
Commanding Olliccr, and tlic wholc body of troops inorcd off in ailcncc. Tlicrc 
was knrdlya Eound h a r d  till tho firingcornmcnccd ; all RaS dono by riircct pcraonal 
communication, from the Gcncml down to  thc 1c:tdcr of each little squad, nnd each 
comninndcr was absolutely frcc to act as ho thought wcll. I think, if tho disciplinc 
of troops will ndniit of it, that silcncc b of w r y  great adrnntagc on actirc scrricc. 
Tlicrc is oiilp onc otlicr point, and that is as to thc Uinpircs. I quitc agrcc with 
Mnjor Ucuclcrson. I bclicrc that tho hrgcjt  amount of adrantago from man- 
aur rc s  for thc Army will result from a thorough systcm of umpiring. Tsctical 
faults a t  o ficld day sliould bc corrcctcd on thc spot and at tlic tiinc. Tlicn all 
m k s  bcncfiL br thc corrcction and lcarn. Frequent dcuisioiie by Umpirca gircn 
during pauscs in cnch day’s opcmtions nro tlic most bcncficial for troop, nud, 
nborc aU get thc nblcst arid bcet informcd Olliccrs to act  a9 Umpircs. Thc result 
of all modcrn fighting must bo disorder: nnd the problem for troops is to  rc- 
organito that clisordcr for trcsii efforts ; and in niy opinion o carcfully planned 
attack, such as Xajor IIcndcrson spcnks of, is not tho bcjt plan for instructing 
troops. I do not pdtlicr from this lccturc that Major IIcndcrson E ~ H  such a 
gs tcm of rcorpnitatiou of disorder at tlicsc rnanuuvrc~, though no doubt lic did 
scc tlic extraodinarg nrrangcincnts by rliick thc French pcoplc h a ~ e  been ablc to  
fcrd nnd niaiiccurro 100,000 incn ic dirisions, corps, and ns ono  arm^ acting on tho 
dcfcnsirc for such a forcc in i~ comparatircly conliiiccl nrca, and that thcrc mas no 
liitcli tlirougliout. Uut, ou tho othcr liand, thcrc was no cnciiig to crcnto thc hitch. 
Xnjor HESDEI~SOS : TLc first question put to mc was br Sir Emsmus Om- 
manncy, asking vhctlicr, in my opinion, the smokelcss ponder most farourcd tlio 
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nttnck or thc dcfcncc. I think i t  is difIicu~t o suu up ‘the wliolc qiicitian in n 
single eentcnce. Siiiokelcs3 porvdcr cc r tddy  fnfours thc nttack in onc most ini- 
portant point; and thij  io  that the artillcry nrc nblc to  fire orcr the bcads of thcir 
o m  infnntrJ-, zntil ?Iic latter get wcll within clccisirc ranw. As eoon ns tlic 
assailant liaa silcnccd tlic dcfcnding bnttcrics, thc two n r i h s  would l o  nble to  
combine, in o much morc cffcctire ninnner.tlinn has hitherto bccn thc cacc, against 
the defending infantrj-. Wi th  regnrl to  tlic defence, tlierc is much adrantage 
gaincd by tlic T idd i ty  of the iittacking lines. Ylicir numbcrs may be cnsil~ 
cetiniatcd. It was differcnt in tlic days of thc old ponder. h’ow, with smokeless 
powder JOU can ECC tlie first line nnd its frac!ions; tlie sccond line in rear; tlic 
third line bcliind again; nnd thc rererres far awry in tlic distancc. In  open 
. country you can ca1ciiIatc nccuratcly tlic nuinbcr of troops you L ~ T C  to den1 with. 
Tlirn ns to D denionrtrntivc nttack. \\‘c nll noticed how eoon it becnnio nppnrcnt 
tliat it mas onlr n feint; ercn thc soldiers in tlic ranks used to laugh nnd cay, 
“Tliat fellow docs not incan i t ;  hc is no? coming on: thc rcal nttack \sill bc froin 
orcr tlierc.” I t  is cnry, nlicn tlirrc is no smoki-, to FCC d ic ihcr  troops rcdly iii- 
tend coming on. Tlic whole opcration morcd slowly; tlicre was no cncrgy 
ahout i t ;  and 1011 could 6cc tlicrc acre  not so many line3 in rcnr. I n  one 
tray or nnotlicr tlic ilcmonstratire attack could nlrrays bc clctectcd, nnd this is 
ratlicr an important point i n  niodern tsctics. Gcncral Qootlciiougli nrkcd nbout 
rignnlling.’ Si,ydling wa3 ‘cry little used. The Frcncli hart .flag sipallcrs, but 
I do not think I c w r  raw tlie flags taken out. They Inre n system of eimallin,n 
with Inmps and mirrors nhicli a n  bc used cquallg wcll by d:tj  and by nyglit. 1 
~ a w  them used both bg day and night, though not oftcn. Tlic stntions I noticcd 
wcrc about a cocplc of milcs or so apart; but t l i q  sag in France that thc stations 
can be much fiirtlicr npart and tbat they can read the lamp eignals quite casily nt 
crcn 30 liilonictrcs. Yhcy give u rcry briglit light crcii on a briglit sumiiicr’s day, 
but they nrc n t l ic r  cluiusy to  carry. As to  thc niap ivliicli w r c  used by thc 
RegiiiienfnI Ofliccrs, 1 do not know on ahat material they ae rc  priritcd. I sfiauld 
rather fancy thin mnp card-board. Thc 
supply of wvnicr I cannot say nnjthing nbout. I ncrcr eaw water following tlic 
troops on tlie marcli, but thcy nlrays had their cantccn nngons; nnd their watcr 
bottlcs nre lillcd not Tithwatcr, but with winc. 
Gcncrnl GOODESOIXII: Thc cantccn carriagcs arc not to bc confoundcd witli tlic 
wntcr carriages? 
Nnior UESIIEBSOS : Xo, they nre rcgular cantccn carrinncs-cantiniErcs. A s  to  
tlie Zfinpircs,~ can girc rcry little information. ~ i c r c f s  a n  Officer liere who 
probably knows morc nbout tlie Umpires nnd tlicir sjrtcin tliaii I do. 1 can girc 
Gcncral Goodenougli n copy of tlic Umpire Hcgulntions. I think t h y  wcrc not 
at all satisfied with tlic Umpires nt the iiirnmmes, and tlicy think of clianging the 
sjstcm. 
Gencral GOODESOCGII : Jly object nns to gct scmcthing nliicli might bc u s c f d  
on tlic Procccdings. 
Captain C O U ~ T  : I belicrc they knd nbout 70 Officera, nnd they put crery 
ecnior Gcncnl Ofliccr in charge, nnd tach of tlicsc Uiiipircs Iiad ccrtnin sections of 
ground and D crrtain numbcr of units to look after on both sidcs. Of cnursc it is 
r e v  hard work to  follow exactly liorr the1 workcdon cacli side; but, us I heard on 
scrcral occasions, tlic OiIicers were not nt a11 satisfie4 with the sjstcrn. 
Gcncnl GOODESOVGII :You rnr that  tlie instructions nrc cinbodicd in Rcgulii- 
tions? 
Captain A Cocar : l-rs, there nrc Regulation?. 
TIic Ci1.mnr.m : I think, with your pcrniission, I niar girc the thank3 of tbc  
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Tlrcy m r c  on tho scnlc of d-. 
~nccting to 3Injor Ucndcrron for his uorl cxccllcnt lccturc. 
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